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The Delaware Supreme Court delivered its final opinion in the
highly publicized case, Brehm v. Eisner (the Disney case), which involved
the firing without cause of Disney's president, Michael Ovitz., This not-
for-cause termination resulted in a $130 million severance package after
only fourteen months of service.2 Ovitz's termination was effected on
Disney's behalf by its chief executive officer (CEO) Michael Eisner.3
The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the chancery court's
decision, ruling that the business judgment rule protected the decision to
terminate Ovitz, and the accompanying severance payment.4
Consequently, the defendant directors and officers did not violate their
fiduciary duties or commit waste.5 Much scholarly writing has been
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** J.D., Southern Methodist University Dedman School of Law, 2oo8. The Authors thank
Professors Roy Anderson, Alan Bromberg, Nathan Cortez, Greg Crespi, and C. Paul Rogers III, for
their thoughtful comments. We also express our appreciation to Mr. Ignacio Hirigoyen for his research
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i. Brehm v. Eisner (In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig.), 9o6 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006).
2. Id. at 35.
3. Id. at 43-44.
4. Id. at 73.
5. Id. at 35-36. Shareholders alleged violations of the duty of care, duty of good faith, and duty
of loyalty, as well as corporate waste. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 9o7 A.2d 693, 745-56
(Del. Ch. 2005). In order to prove "waste," plaintiff must show "an exchange that is so one sided that
no business person of ordinary, sound judgment could conclude that the corporation has received
adequate consideration." Glazer v. Zapata Corp., 658 A.2d 176, 183 (Del. Ch. 1993). Generally, this
means that plaintiff-shareholders must show that the transaction "served no corporate purpose" or
that the corporation "received no consideration at all." White v. Panic, 783 A.2d 543, 554 (Del. 2001).
Due to this onerous burden, corporate waste is rarely found. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative
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generated surrounding the decision in the Disney case; this commentary
has focused on the Delaware Supreme Court's examination of executive
compensation, the business judgment rule, director fiduciary duties, and,
in particular, the duty of good faith.6
The Delaware Supreme Court's holding in Disney indeed is
important due to the protection that the court afforded to directors and
officers under the business judgment rule. However, the court seems to
have committed a crucial (and thus far ignored) oversight in its analysis:
did Eisner, as CEO, have the authority to terminate Ovitz without cause?
Fundamental principles of agency law and corporate governance militate
against Eisner's authority as CEO to unilaterally fire Disney's president.
Surprisingly, the court spent only two pages of its forty-eight page
decision addressing this question.7 This Article explores the gaps in the
court's reasoning surrounding this important issue, as well as the
ramifications flowing from this reasoning.
The implications of this aspect of the court's decision in Disney are
far reaching. Indeed, in this climate of post-Sarbanes-Oxley corporate
governance, great emphasis is placed on the concept of independent
directors.8 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act,9 stock exchange rules, and scores of
court opinions laud the vigilant presence of independent directors as a
check and balance on corporate insiders.'" With this framework in mind,
Litig., 907 A.2d at 749.
6. See, e.g., Sarah Helene Duggin & Stephen M. Goldman, Restoring Trust in Corporate
Directors: The Disney Standard and the "New" Good Faith, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 211, 218 (2006)
(discussing the duty of good faith); Andrew S. Gold, A Decision Theory Approach to the Business
Judgment Rule: Reflections on Disney, Good Faith, and Judicial Uncertainty, 66 MD. L. REV. 398, 402-
03 (2007) (discussing the business judgment rule and the duty of good faith); Nadelle Grossman,
Director Compliance with Elusive Fiduciary Duties in a Climate of Corporate Governance Reform, I2
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 393, 397 (2007) (discussing directors' fiduciary duties); Claire A. Hill &
Brett H. McDonnell, Disney, Good Faith, and Structural Bias, 32 J. CORP. L. 833, 855-57 (2007)
(suggesting a two-part test relying on structural bias and gross negligence to show lack of good faith);
Jennifer S. Martin, The House of Mouse and Beyond: Assessing the SEC's Efforts to Regulate
Executive Compensation, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 481, 487 (2007) (discussing executive compensation);
Hillary A. Sale, Monitoring Caremark's Good Faith, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 719, 720-21 (2007) (discussing
the duty of good faith).
7. See Brehm, 906 A.2d at 68-70.
8. See, e.g., 148 CONO. REC. E 1470, 1475 (July 29, 2002) (statement of Lynn Turner, former
Chief Accountant, Securities Exchange Commission) ("We need to definitely strengthen the corporate
governance. It has failed us. We need good, independent corporate boards, just like we need good,
independent analysts and good, independent auditors."); Executive Compensation and Related
Person Disclosure, Securities Act Release No. 8732A, Exchange Act Release No. 54302A, Investment
Company Act Release No. 27444A, 71 Fed. Reg. 53,158 (Sept. 8, 2006).
9. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-2o4, i 16 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections
of I 1, 15, i8, 28, and 29 U.S.C.).
Io. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § IoA(m)(3)(A), Pub. L. No. 291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified
as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-I(m)(3)(A) (2006)) (requiring independent directors to serve on the
audit committee); NYSE, Inc., Listed Company Manual § 303A.oi (2003) (requiring a majority of the
board of directors to be independent): NASDAQ, Inc., Manual Rule 4350(c) (2003) (requiring
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the importance of the Delaware Supreme Court's oversight becomes
evident: to what degree will the positive role that independent directors
ostensibly play be diminished when CEOs are permitted to take
unilateral actions such as the one in the Disney case? Indeed, what
adverse impact on corporate governance will resonate when
extraordinary business decisions such as these can be taken by the CEO?
Ironically, in spite of the Delaware Supreme Court's consistent support,
at least in theory, for independent directors to play a meaningful role in
corporate governance," this decision in practical effect gives undue
deference to extraordinary unilateral actions implemented by dominant
CEOs.
I. THE MAGIC KINGDOM: OVITZ, EISNER, AND DISNEY
For our purposes here, the Disney saga begins with the tragic death
in April 1994 of Frank Wells, the then-president and chief operating
officer (COO) of the Walt Disney Company (Disney), in a helicopter
crash.'2 CEO Michael Eisner temporarily assumed the presidency of the
company until his diagnosis with heart disease hastened Disney's need to
hire a new president. 3 Eisner looked to his long-time friend Michael
Ovitz, founder of Creative Artist Agency (CAA) and "one of the most
powerful figures in Hollywood."'4
At the time, Ovitz was involved in discussions with Music
Corporation of America (MCA) to serve as chairman and CEO of
MCA.'5 The terms being negotiated offered Ovitz "3.5% of MCA, $I.5
million in Seagram shares, and a seven-year contract (with a three-year
majority independence on the board of directors); see also, e.g., Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 366-67
(Del. 2006) (discussing the importance of director independence in demand futility cases); Paramount
Commc'ns v. QVC Network, 637 A.2d 34, 44 (Del. 1994) (discussing independent director scrutiny of
sale of control transactions); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954-55 (Del. 1985)
(discussing the importance of director independence in the decision to use defensive tactics in the
corporate takeover context).
i i. See, e.g., Paramount Commc'ns, 637 A.ad at 44 (discussing the importance of independent
directors in sale of control transactions); Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 126r, 1285
(Del. 1989) (discussing the role of independent directors in scrutinizing transactions); Unocal, 493
A.2d at 955 (discussing the role of independent directors in the use of defensive tactics in corporate
takeovers); Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779,788-89 (Del. i98I) (establishing independence
as the first part of a two-part test for determining the legitimacy of a special litigation committee). See
generally MARC I. STEINBERG, CORPORATE INTERNAL AFFAIRS: A CORPORATE AND SECURITIES LAW
PERSPECTIVE 157-61, 240-42 (1983); Victor Brudney, The Independent Director: Heavenly City or
Potemkin Village?. 95 HARV. L. REV. 597 (1982).
12. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 699 (Del. Ch. 2005), affd sub nom.
Brehm v. Eisner, 9o6 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006).
13. See Bernard Weinraub, Despite His Defeat in Disneyland, Ovitz Remains a Force to Reckon
with, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1996, at A35; see also In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d at
699; Gold, supra note 6, at 410.
14. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 9o7 A.2d at 7o1; see also Gold, supra note 6, at 410-1I.
15. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d at 701.
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renewal option) that paid a seven-figure salary with performance-based
cash bonuses.' 6 For various reasons, however, no agreement was
consummated,'7 and Ovitz returned to CAA until he learned that his
close friend and associate at CAA was leaving for MCA.'"
During this time period, Eisner and Irwin Russell, the chairman of
Disney's compensation committee, more aggressively pursued
negotiations with Ovitz.'9 At CAA, Ovitz was making about $25 million
annually and owned 55% of the company, which he made clear that he
would not give up without "downside protection.""0 During the course of
negotiations, Ovitz somehow acquired a mistaken impression of his likely
role in Disney's governance structure: Ovitz relied on several statements
Eisner had made to him, and understood that "he and Eisner would run
Disney as partners."' Despite Ovitz's mistaken impressions and a series
of complex negotiations regarding compensation structure, a deal was
eventually wrought between Ovitz and Disney that seemed agreeable to
both parties. Ovitz agreed to assume the presidency of Disney, but would
not become COO or co-CEO; Disney agreed to an employment
agreement with Ovitz valued at $23.6 million per year, with a two-year
renewal option that would raise the estimated value to $24.1 million per
year.
A term sheet for the agreement (but not the actual agreement) was
eventually presented to the compensation committee of Disney's board
of directors, which met for a total of one hour to consider Ovitz's
employment as well as four additional unrelated matters.23 At that
meeting, the compensation committee unanimously approved the
general terms of the agreement." At subsequent executive and regular
sessions of the board of directors, the board deliberated further, voting
unanimously to hire Ovitz as president. 5 The compensation committee
16. Id. See generally Hubert B. Herring, Michael Ovitz: The 5 Million Option Man at Disney, N.Y.
TIMES, NOV. 26, 1995, at Fro.
17. JAMES B. STEWART, DISNEY WAR 199-200 (2005).
18. See Kim Masters, The Power Shuffle: For the Titans of Tinseltown, A High-Stakes Game of
Musical Chairs, WASH. POST, Aug. 2o, 1995, at GI; see also In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907
A.2d at 701. Ron Meyer, Ovitz's close friend and partner at CAA, left the agency to join Universal
(formerly MCA, the company with which Ovitz himself had been negotiating). STEWART, supra note
17, at 202.
19. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d at 702.
20. Id.; see also STEWART, supra note 17, at 213.
21. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d at 703; see also STEWART, supra note 17, at
212-13; Weinraub, supra note 13, at A35.
22. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d at 706.
23. Brehm v. Eisner (In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig.), 906 A.2d 27, 40 (Del. 2oo6); In re
Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d at 7o8; see also Edwin W. Hecker, Jr., Fiduciary Duties in
Business Entities, 54 KAN. L. REV. 975, 997 (20O6).
24. Brehm, 9o6 A.2d at 40; In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 9o7 A.2d at 708-09; Gold,
supra note 6, at 412.
25. Brehm, 906 A.2d at 40-41: In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d at 708-09.
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met one more time to consider certain issues relating to "stock options";
at the conclusion of this meeting, the compensation committee ratified
the entire employment agreement.2
6
The terms of the employment agreement consisted of an annual
salary of $i million and a performance-based discretionary bonus."7 The
agreement also included two tranches of stock options that would
provide Ovitz downside protection." The contract contained a five-year
term, with an extension and renewal option. 9 Finally, both parties were
protected from premature termination of the employment agreement.3"
For example, if Ovitz prematurely terminated the agreement, he would
forfeit any unaccrued benefits, and could arguably be precluded from
working for any of Disney's competitors." More importantly for the
purposes of this Article, if Disney terminated Ovitz "for any reason other
than gross negligence or malfeasance," then the resulting no-fault
payment would include (i) Ovitz's "remaining salary, [(ii)] $7.5 million a
year for unaccrued bonuses, [(iii)] the immediate vesting of his first
tranche of options[,] and [(iv)] a $io million cash out payment for the
second tranche of options."'" Thus, Ovitz's premature termination by
Disney for any reason other than gross negligence or malfeasance would
result in a substantial, if not exorbitant, severance payment.
After several months with the company, it became apparent that
Ovitz did not fit into the corporate culture at Disney.33 Eisner ultimately
communicated to Ovitz that he should begin seeking other employment
opportunities, which eventually culminated in negotiations to "trade"
Ovitz to Sony; however, only a select few of Disney's directors were even
aware that Ovitz was given permission to negotiate with Sony. 4
Unfortunately for Disney, the deal with Sony was never consummated,
26. Brehm, 9o6 A.2d at 41; In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d at 710.
27. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d at 703.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 703-04.
30. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d at 703, 705; see also STEWART, supra note 17,
at 218-i9.
31. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d at 704; see STEWART, supra note 17, at 273.
There seems to have been some disagreement in the facts as to whether the employment agreement
actually contained a valid covenant not to compete. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907
A.2d at 704 n.32.
32. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d at 704; see also Steven H. Kropp, Corporate
Governance, Executive Compensation, Corporate Performance, and Worker Rights in Bankruptcy:
Some Lessons from Game Theory, 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 33 (2OO7).
33. Brehm v. Eisner (In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig.), 9o6 A.2d 27, 42 (Del. 2006); see
also Renee M. Jones, Rethinking Corporate Federalism in the Era of Corporate Reform, 29 J. CoRP. L.
625, 651 (2004).
34. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d at 724-25: STEWART, supra note 17, at 258,
264-65; Bernard Weinraub, Ovitz, Hollywood Power Broker, Resigns from No. 2 Job at Disney, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 13, 1996, at Ai.
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and Ovitz remained at Disney.35 At the next board meeting, Eisner's
dissatisfaction with Ovitz's performance and desire to terminate him was
never formally discussed. However, Eisner personally informed a
majority of the directors about the emerging "Ovitz problem."37
Despite public statements where Eisner and Ovitz sought to dispel
rumors of discord at Disney, Eisner continued drafting a series of letters
indicating his opinion that Ovitz was no longer welcome at Disney and
that his future with the company was doubtful.38 Eisner began discussing
possibilities for Ovitz's termination with General Counsel Sanford
Litvack; Eisner wished to explore whether Disney could fire Ovitz for
cause, or whether it would have to implement a not-for-cause
termination.39 This distinction was critical because, according to the terms
of Ovitz's employment agreement, a not-for-cause termination would
trigger a substantial severance payment, while a termination for cause
would avoid such payment.4" At the next board meeting, Ovitz's
termination was not discussed in full session with the board.4 Indeed,
although "[b]y then the board knew that Ovitz was going to be fired," the
board in fact renominated him to another three-year term on the board.42
At the executive session that followed the meeting, Eisner informed
those directors present that he intended to fire Ovitz in the near future.43
Finally, after Ovitz returned from holiday with another board
member who revealed some of Eisner's feelings to Ovitz, Ovitz realized
that his time with Disney was quickly coming to a close.' Ovitz met with
Eisner and, through Russell (who served as chair of Disney's
compensation committee), began negotiating his departure from
Disney.45 Eventually, Eisner met with Ovitz at Eisner's mother's
35. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d at 725.
36. See id. at 726.
37. Eisner and several board members testified that Eisner had discussed with a majority of the
corporate directors the problems with Ovitz's performance as president. Id. Note that informal
discussion among directors does not a board meeting make. See infra note 118 and accompanying text.
38. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 9o7 A.2d at 725-3
o. Eisner sent some of these letters
to his colleagues, including Irwin Russell, but failed to send them to Ovitz himself. See, e.g., id. at 727;
STEWART, supra note 17, at 264-68. These letters conveyed Eisner's dissatisfaction with Ovitz, including
his distaste for Ovitz's personality and leadership skills at Disney. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative
Litig., 9o7 A.2d at 725-29.
39. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 9o7 A.2d at 728; STEWART, supra note 17, at 273; Ben
White, Eisner Denies Seeing Ovitz as Threatening: CEO Says He Relied on Legal Adviser, WASH. POST,
Nov. 18, 2004, at E3.
40. The terms of the employment agreement limited "cause" to gross negligence and
malfeasance. See Gold, supra note 6, at 41i; supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
41. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 9o7 A.2d at 730.
42. Brehm v. Eisner (In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig.), 9o6 A.2d 27, 44 (Del. 2006).
43. The Chancellor found that at a minimum, Eisner, Stanley Gold, Reveta Bowers, Ray Watson,
and Robert Stern, and perhaps others as well, were in attendance at the executive session. Id.




apartment, where he informed Ovitz that he was being terminated
without cause, and would therefore receive his contractual not-for-cause
termination compensation of almost $130 million. 6 Eisner and Ovitz then
agreed on a press release and "memorialized" the termination in a letter
signed the next day by Disney's general counsel, Sanford Litvack, and
dated December 12, 1996."7 As the Delaware Supreme Court observed,
"[t]he board was not shown the [December 12] letter, nor did it meet to
approve its terms."' On December 12, 1996, Disney issued a press
release disclosing the termination, which it disseminated to its board of
directors. 9 Ovitz thus was terminated from the Disney presidency,
despite the fact that, in the words of the Delaware Chancery Court, "the
Disney board had never met in order to vote on, or even discuss, the
termination at a full session, and few if any directors did an independent
investigation of whether Ovitz could be terminated for cause."5 ° In fact,
the full board did not convene again until January 27, 1997, almost a
week after several shareholders filed their lawsuits.
II. DETHRONING THE PRINCE OF THE MAGIC KINGDOM: AUTHORITY TO
REMOVE PRINCE NOT-SO-CHARMING OVITZ
Plaintiffs in the Disney case brought a multitude of claims against
the company and its fiduciaries.52 For the purposes of this Article, the
foregoing analysis will focus on only one of those claims: whether Eisner,
alone and without Disney's board of directors, was authorized to
terminate Ovitz 3 The Delaware Supreme Court dedicated only two
pages of its forty-eight page opinion to discussion of this subject,4 despite
the fact that this issue was critical when considering not only plaintiffs'
claims, but also the wider implications impacting Delaware corporate
governance.
46. Id. at 732, 734; STEWART, supra note 17, at 274.
47. Brehm, 9o6 A.2d at 45; STEWART, supra note 17, at 274-75.
48. Brehm, 9o6 A.2d at 45.
49. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d at 735; Paul Farhi, Ovitz Departs Disney
After 16 Months, WASH. POST, Dec. 13, 1996, Di; see also STEWART, supra note 17, at 276.
50. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d at 736; see also Brehm, 906 A.2d at 45.
51. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.zd at 739. Two derivative shareholder suits were
filed in the Delaware Chancery Court, and yet another suit was filed in state court in California; the
cases were eventually consolidated. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., No. 15452, 1997 Del.
Ch. LEXIS 25 (Del. Ch. Mar. 13, 1997).
52. These claims included those based on breaches of the fiduciary duties of care and loyalty
(including allegations that the defendants acted in bad faith) as well as the commission of waste. See In
re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 9o7 A.2d at 696.
53. See id. at 724-40.
54. Brehm v. Eisner (In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig.), 9o6 A.2d 27, 68-7o (Del. 2006).
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A. FOLLOWING THE LEADER: THE SUPREME COURT'S ANALYSIS
The Delaware Supreme Court began its analysis of this issue by
examining Disney's constitutive documents. Disney's certificate of
incorporation provides that the company's officers "shall hold their
offices for such terms and shall carry out such duties as are determined
solely by the Board of Directors, subject to the right of the Board of
Directors to remove any officer... at any time with or without cause.""5
Article IV of the company's bylaws states that the CEO "shall, subject to
the provisions of these Bylaws and the control of the Board of Directors,
have general and active management, direction and supervision over the
business of the Corporation and over its officers." 6 The court continued
its analysis of CEO Eisner's authority based upon these two provisions
contained in the certificate of incorporation and the company bylaws. 7
The supreme court next suggested two hypothetical cases in which a
clear answer would exist. 8 First, there would be no concurrent power of
removal in the CEO and the board of directors if the certificate of
incorporation exclusively vested such power of removal in the board.59
Thus, "absent an express delegation of authority from the board, the
presiding officer would... not have a concurrent removal power."" It is
important to emphasize at this point that the court made a fundamental
flaw in its analysis. If the certificate of incorporation vested exclusive
removal power in the board of directors, then no board resolution could
validly provide concurrent removal power in any officer because under
settled principles of corporate governance, a mere board resolution
cannot override or contradict the subject company's bylaws or certificate
of incorporation.6' Indeed, the court may have intended to refer to
ratification of an agent's actions, but this is distinct from the exclusivity of
removal authority. This topic will be explored further below.
6
In the other hypothetical situation, there would be concurrent
removal power if "the governing instruments expressly placed the power
of removal in both the board and specified officers." According to the
55. Id. at 69 (footnote omitted).
56. WALT DISNEY Co., AMENDED AND RESTATED BYLAWS OF THE WALT DISNEY COMPANY 9 (I999)
[hereinafter DISNEY BYLAWS], available at http://corporate.disney.go.com/media/corporate/DisneyBy
laws.pdf.
57. Brehm, 906 A.2d at 68-69.
58. Id. at 68.
59. Id. at 69.
60. Id.
6i. See Hollinger Int'l, Inc. v. Black, 844 A.2d 1022, io8o (Del. Ch. 2004) (referencing that bylaws
are of a lower tier than a corporation's certificate of incorporation and stating that "a board cannot
override a bylaw requirement by merely adopting a resolution"); HARRY G. HENN & JOHN R.
ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES § 15 (3d ed. 1983).
62. See infra Part II.F.
63. Brehm, 9o6 A.2d at 69.
[Vol. 6o:201
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court, however, Disney's governing documents "could reasonably be
interpreted either way" and are "ambiguous" because they "do not vest
the removal power exclusively in the board, nor do they express! give
the Board Chairman/CEO a concurrent power to remove officers."
Based upon this ambiguity, the Delaware Supreme Court resorted to
rules of construction (including the rules of construction relating to the
interpretation of contracts) to determine whether Eisner had concurrent
power with the board of directors to remove officers.6' According to the
court, "extrinsic evidence clearly supports the conclusion that the board
and Eisner understood that Eisner... had concurrent power with the
board to terminate Ovitz as President., 66 Such extrinsic evidence
included the testimony of various board members who believed that
Eisner had the authority to terminate Ovitz without their approval, and
the general counsel's testimony that many Disney officers had been
terminated without action from the board of directors.6 ' The court
therefore found that "Eisner possessed, and exercised, the power to
terminate Ovitz unilaterally., 68 This holding followed from an analysis
that seemingly considered solely two provisions in the company's
governing documents and the testimony of various directors and officers
of the company, some of whom were defendants in the case.6" At no
point in its analysis did the Delaware Supreme Court go beyond this
evidence to examine the law of agency or general principles of Delaware
corporate governance. In fact, despite the court's statement that it would
resort to rules of construction, the court declined sufficiently to do so.7"
B. WHISTLING WHILE WE WORK: CONSTRUCTION OF DISNEY'S GOVERNING
DOCUMENTS
Consistent with the Delaware Supreme Court's opinion, this Article
likewise begins its analysis in the same manner: with the governing
documents of the Walt Disney Company. As the opinion states, the
certificate of incorporation provides that officers "shall hold their offices
for such terms and shall carry out such duties as are determined solely by
the Board of Directors, subject to the right of the Board of Directors to
remove any officer.., at any time with or without cause." 7' This
language describes the authority of the board over officers' tenures and




67. Id. at 69-7 o .
68. Id. at 70.
69. The court refers to the testimony of several board members and General Counsel Sanford
Litvack. Id. at 69-70.
70. See id. at 69.
71. Id. at 68.
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determined "solely" by the board of directors. Thus, the court read this
statement and applied it "solely" to the right of the board of directors to
determine the terms and duties of officers. The following phrase, which
describes the power to remove officers, does not repeat the word
"solely." In fact, it provides that such officers are "subject to the right of
the Board of Directors to remove any officer.""2
The Delaware Supreme Court accordingly adhered to a
questionable interpretation of Disney's certificate of incorporation;
because the word "solely" is not repeated before the right of removal,
the phrase is construed as not granting an exclusive right of removal to
the board of directors.73 Unfortunately, the court expended little effort in
ascertaining whether the certificate of incorporation provides for
exclusive board authority for this matter. Indeed, while the word "solely"
vests the Disney board of directors with the exclusive right to determine
the terms and duties of offices and officers, query whether the term
"solely" should be read to apply to the phrase that immediately follows,
regarding the removal of officers.
Based on the supreme court's decision, although not for certain, the
court apparently deems important the presence of the comma before the
phrase "subject to the right of the Board of Directors to remove any
officer."" Under long-settled Delaware law, "[lt]he same rules which
govern the construction of statutes, contracts and other written
instruments, are made use of in construing the provisions and
determining the meaning of charters and grants of corporate powers and
privileges."" Thus, when considering the importance of a comma in
construing language contained in a subject corporation's certificate of
incorporation, familiar rules of statutory and contractual construction
should apply.
In general, punctuation may be employed as an aid in construing a
contract. 6 However, "[w]hen construing the meaning of contractual
72. Id. Although the chancery court opinion does not explicitly address this issue, Chancellor
Chandler read the certificate of incorporation and the bylaws, as well as the board resolution electing
Ovitz as president, to create a concurrent power of removal. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig.,
9o7 A.2d 693, 774 (Del. Ch. 2005), affd sub nom. Brehm v. Eisner, 9o6 A.2d 27 (Del. 2oo6). The
chancellor relies on the language of the documents, the custom and practice of Disney, and the
"implied authority" of the CEO to reach the conclusion that the certificate of incorporation did not
deprive Eisner of the power to remove Ovitz from the company's presidency. Id. at 774-75. Thus,
Chancellor Chandler seems to read the certificate of incorporation's express delegation of exclusive
board authority narrowly, consequently broadening the powers of the CEO.
73. Brehm, 9o6 A.2d at 69.
74. Id. at 68.
75. Lawson v. Household Fin. Corp., 152 A. 723, 726 (Del. 1930); see Benihana of Tokyo, Inc. v.
Benihana, Inc., 9o6 A.2d 114, 120 (Del. 2oo6); Hibbert v. Hollywood Park, Inc., 457 A.2d 339, 342-43
(Del. 1983).
76. Plymouth Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. I11. Mid-Continent Life Ins. Co. of Chi., Ill., 378 F.2d 389, 391
(3 d Cir. 1967); see also New Castle County, Del. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., 174
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terms, [courts] will not allow sloppy grammatical arrangement of the
clauses or mistakes in punctuation to vitiate the manifest intent of the
parties as gathered from the language of the contract."77 Indeed, the
United States Supreme Court has recognized that punctuation "is a most
fallible standard by which to interpret a writinF," and therefore should
only be resorted to "when all other means fail."7 Hence, in the context of
statutory interpretation, punctuation may not necessarily be decisive in
determining the meaning of the statute.79
Thus, the Delaware Supreme Court in Disney evidently placed
undue reliance on the presence of the comma between the phrase
bestowing upon the board the sole power to determine terms and duties,
and the phrase subjecting those officers to removal by the board. While
punctuation may provide assistance in construing Disney's certificate of
incorporation, the comma alone should not be sufficient to create what
the court considers an ambiguity.
As important, the fact that the word "solely" is separated from the
phrase addressing officer removal does not necessarily mean that the two
phrases should be read in strict isolation. Indeed, perhaps the more
reasonable construction is that the term "solely" applies to both the
power to determine terms and duties, and the power to remove officers
with or without cause. Such a reading becomes more compelling when
considering that the phrase "subject to" seems to connect the two clauses
together, thereby suggesting that "solely" should apply to the removal
clause as well.
Furthermore, Delaware adheres to an objective theory of contracts,
applying the plain meaning rule in construing contracts, which presumes
that "the language of a contract governs when no ambiguity exists.""
This rule presumes that the intent of the parties is to be determined by
F.3d 338, 348 n.io (3d Cir. 1999).
77. Interim Healthcare, Inc. v. Spherion Corp., 884 A.2d 513, 555 (Del. Super. Ct. 2005) (footnote
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). See generally Levy v. Hayes Lemmerz Int'l, Inc., No.
1395-N, 2oo6 Del. Ch. LEXIS 68, at *28 (Del. Ch. Apr. 5, 2oo6).
78. Ewing's Lessee v. Burnet, 36 U.S. 41, 54 (1837); see also In re W.T. Grant Co., 4 B.R. 53, 71
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. i98o).
79. See, e.g., Costanzo v. Tillinghast, 287 U.S. 341, 344 (1932); United States v. Morris, 928 F.2d
504,507 (2d Cir. i991).
8o. Med. Wind Down Holdings III, Inc. v. InnerDyne, Inc. (In re Med. Wind Down Holdings III.,
Inc.), 332 B.R. 98, 104 (Bankr. D. Del. 2005) (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis omitted); see
also Ingram v. Thorpe, 747 A.2d 545, 547 (Del. 20oo) (discussing the plain meaning rule as applied to
statutes); Sanders v. Wang, No. 16640, 1999 Del. Ch. LEXIS 203, at *18 (Del. Ch. Nov. 8, 1999)
(discussing the plain meaning rule in connection with a stock ownership plan); Haft v. Haft, 671 A.2d
413, 417 (Del. Ch. 1995) (discussing the objective theory of contract formation in construing a stock
transfer and irrevocable proxy transaction). "Under the plain meaning rule of contract construction, if
a contract is 'clear on its face, the Court should rely solely on the clear literal meaning of the words."'
Sanders, 1999 Del. Ch. LEXIS 203, at * 18 (quoting Demetree v. Commonwealth Trust Co., No. 14354,
1996 Del. Ch. LEXIS 112, at "iI (Del. Ch. Aug. 27, 1996).
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giving the contract terms "their ordinary meaning," and that such
meaning "should not be 'torture[d]' to impart ambiguity where none
exists." 'Moreover, under the "plain meaning" rule, the court should not
resort to use of extrinsic evidence if the contract terms are
unambiguous." Against this backdrop, the court's treatment of this issue
is troubling. Clearly, the court should have been more circumspect to
ensure that its seemingly casual finding of ambiguity in the terms of the
certificate of incorporation did not create an ambiguity where, in fact,
none existed."'
The court next sought to read further ambiguity into the certificate
of incorporation provision by considering it in conjunction with the
bylaws, which provide that the CEO "shall, subject to the provisions of
the Bylaws and the control of the Board of Directors, have general and
active management, direction, and supervision over the business of the
Corporation and over its officers."" Taken together, the court found that
Disney's corporate governing documents are ambiguous, thereby
enabling the court to consider legal rules of construction and extrinsic
evidence to resolve the ambiguity." However, whether these provisions
should be read as being ambiguous, and thereby necessitating application
of rules of construction and extrinsic evidence, is a difficult question that
the court declined to analytically resolve.
On their face, it may be asserted that the certificate of incorporation
and bylaws86 do not create the requisite ambiguity. As such, resort to
extrinsic evidence therefore becomes unnecessary and indeed
impermissible if Delaware adheres to the "plain meaning" rule. It is true
that "where the language is not expressed with that clarity of expression
which permits of but one reasonable interpretation, the language must be
said to be ambiguous, and resort must be had for assistance through
certain well-established legal rules of construction.
8
,
However, it is also true that the Delaware General Corporation Law
provides that a company's bylaws "may contain any provision, not
inconsistent with law or with the certificate of incorporation, relating to
the business of the corporation, the conduct of its affairs, and its rights or
8i. MBIA Ins. Corp. v. Royal Indem. Co., 426 F.3 d 204, 210 (3 d Cir. 2005) (citing Rhone-Poulenc
Basic Chems. Co. v. Am. Motorists Ins. Co., 616 A.2d 1192, 1196 (Del. 1992)); I.U. N. Am., Inc. v.
A.I.U. Ins. Co., 896 A.2d 880, 885 (Del. Super. Ct. 2006) (footnote omitted).
82. See MBIA Ins. Corp., 426 F.3d at 21o; Eagle Indus., Inc. v. DeVilbiss Health Care, Inc., 702
A.2d 1228, 1232 (Del. 1997).
83. Brehm v. Eisner (In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig.), 9o6 A.2d 27, 69 (Del. 2006).
84. Id. at 68; see DISNEY BYLAWS, supra note 56.
85. Brehm, 9o6 A.2d at 68-69.
86. More specifically, Article Ten of Disney's certificate of incorporation, and Article IV of the
company's bylaws.
87. Standard Power & Light Corp. v. Inv. Assocs., Inc., 51 A.2d 572, 576 (Del. 1947); see In re
Explorer Pipeline Co., 781 A.2d 705,713-14 (Del. Ch. 2001).
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powers or the rights or powers of its stockholders, directors, officers or
employees." ' This statute precludes Disney's bylaws from validly
containing a provision that is inconsistent with the authority granted to
the board of directors in the certificate of incorporation. Furthermore, a
bylaw that conflicts with the certificate of incorporation is a nullity. 
8
Indeed, a corporation's bylaws may never contradict the corporation's
certificate of incorporation.'
Delaware law is therefore clear that the certificate of incorporation
governs over the company bylaws, and that the bylaws cannot contradict
or be inconsistent with the certificate of incorporation and thus must be
construed in a manner consistent with the certificate of incorporation.
Because it would be error to read Disney's bylaws as inconsistent with
the certificate of corporation, the bylaw provision empowering the CEO
with "general and active management, direction, and supervision over
the business of the Corporation and its officers" cannot be interpreted as
contradicting or being inconsistent with the board's authority over
officers under the certificate of incorporation. Any such contradiction or
inconsistency would render the bylaw provision a nullity.' Under such
circumstances, the provision in the certificate of incorporation would
therefore govern. While the bylaws may address additional matters or
provide greater specificity to provisions of the certificate of
incorporation,9" they should not be read to create an ambiguity in the
terms of Disney's governing documents.
C. THE "BEAR NECESSITIES" OF THE BOARD: DELEGATION, STERILIZATION,
AND ABDICATION
Clearly, the certificate of incorporation of a company cannot
contradict Delaware General Corporation Law.93 The law therefore
88. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § io9(b) (2001).
89. Centaur Partners, IV v. Nat'l Intergroup, Inc., 582 A.2d 923, 929 (Del. 599o ) ("Where a by-
law provision is in conflict with a provision of the charter, the by-law provision is a 'nullity."'); see, e.g.,
Burr v. Burr Corp., 291 A.2d 409, 410 (Del. Ch. 1972); 1 DAVID A. DREXLER ET AL., DELAWARE
CORPORATION LAW AND PRACTICE § 9.03 (Supp. 2007).
90. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § io9(b); see also Oberly v. Kirby, 592 A.2d 445, 458 n.6 (Del.
1991).
9
i. See Centaur Partners, 582 A.2d at 929; Burr, 291 A.2d at 41o. Nonetheless, if the certificate of
incorporation is interpreted as ambiguous, then the bylaws may be considered to help determine the
meaning of the certificate of incorporation. See generally 8 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, FLETCHER
CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 4190 (West, perm. ed. 2001).
92. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § io9(b) ("[B]ylaws may contain any provision, not inconsistent
with law or with the certificate of incorporation, relating to the business of the corporation, the
conduct of its affairs, and its rights or powers or the rights or powers of its stockholders, directors,
officers or employees."); Hollinger Int'l, Inc. v. Black, 844 A.2d 1022, 1078 (Del. Ch. 2004)
(recognizing that the broad authority to adopt bylaws under section io9(b) is subject to the limitation
that "bylaws may not conflict with law or the certificate of incorporation").




establishes a hierarchy that determines the respective weight of each
authority: the "by-laws must succumb to the superior authority of the
charter; the charter if it conflicts with the statute must give way; and the
statute, if it conflicts with the constitution, is void."' An examination of
the corporation law in Delaware therefore becomes another step in the
analysis.
Delaware law generally provides that the business and affairs of
each corporation shall be conducted by or under the direction and
supervision of its board of directors.95 Accordingly, it is the subject
corporation's board of directors, rather than its executive officers, that
has ultimate responsibility for overseeing the corporation.9 Although the
board of directors possesses this broad power of management and
oversight, it nonetheless also has the authority to delegate certain
functions to officers and employees.97 When delegation occurs, it is
customary for the board to delegate such authority to officers, who act as
agents of the corporation. Generally, the officers of the corporation are
agents whose actions within the scope of their authority can bind the
corporation to third parties.' While this power to delegate is broad,
certain limits apply.'" Specifically, corporate directors may not delegate
duties that "lie 'at the heart of the management of the corporation ......
Delegation of authority thus becomes an important factor to
consider when determining Eisner's power to terminate Ovitz. Again,
while the power to delegate is broad, certain limits exist on the board's
ability to delegate its authority."2 The board of directors may not "avoid
94. Gaskill, 146 A. at 340; see Roven v. Kotter, 547 A.2d 603, 605 (Del. Ch. 1988) (noting that it is
an "elementary principle of Delaware law" that bylaws are subordinate to the certificate of
incorporation); HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 61 (recognizing the "substatutory intracorporate
hierarchy of provisions, in the form of articles of incorporation, bylaws, shareholder resolutions, [and]
board of directors resolutions").
95. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (with the exception as otherwise provided by statute or in the
subject corporation's certificate of incorporation); see Campbell v. Loew's, Inc., 134 A.2d 852, 856
(Del. Ch. 1957); see also Olson Bros., Inc. v. Englehart, 211 A.2d 61o, 615 (Del. Ch. 1965).
96. Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d 1207, 1214 (Del. 1996); In re Bally's Grand Derivative Litig., No.
14644, 1997 Del. Ch. LEXIS 77, at *12-13 (Del. Ch. June 4, 1997); 1 R. FRANKLIN BALOTrI & JESSE A.
FINKELSTEIN, DELAWARE LAW OF CORPORATIONS & BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 4.16 (3d ed. Supp. 2008).
97. See BALOTrI & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 96.
98. Id.
99. DREXLER ET AL., supra note 89, § 14.02 (Supp. 2006); 2 FLETCHER, supra note 91, § 434; 1
RODMAN WARD, JR. ET AL., FOLK ON THE DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW § 142.6 (4th ed. Supp.
2006).
100. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141.
io. Grimes, 673 A.2d at 1214 (quoting Chapin v. Benwood, 402 A.2d 1205, 1210 (Del. Ch. 1979),
affd sub nom. Harrison v. Chapin, 415 A.2d 1o68 (Del. 198o)).
102. The "board may not either formally or effectively abdicate its statutory power and its
fiduciary duty to manage or direct the management of the business and affairs of the corporation."
WARD, JR. ET AL., supra note 99, § 141; see also Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946,
956-57 (Del. 1985) (holding that the board of directors had the power to oppose a tender offer where
the board had reasonable grounds to believe that a takeover bid presented danger to corporate policy
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its active and direct duty of oversight.""'° Lack of such directorial
oversight "irremediably taints the design and execution of the
transaction.""'° Thus, while the board may delegate the management of
ordinary business affairs to officers, it must retain its broad duty of
oversight. This leads to an examination of the interrelated concepts of
sterilization and abdication.
The New York Court of Appeals articulated the concept of "board
sterilization" in Long Park, Inc. v. Trenton-New Brunswick Theatres
Co."'5 There, the shareholders entered into an agreement in which the
management and supervision of the corporation was vested in a
"manager.""' This agreement essentially divested the board of directors
of any authority to oversee the corporation or to elect or remove the
"manager," by designating the manager, stripping the board of directors
of the authority to remove that manager, and vesting the manager with
complete authority to direct the supervision, operation, and management
of the corporation's business and policies."'° The New York high court
found that such an agreement violated that state's corporation law, which
provided that the "business of a corporation shall be managed by its
board of directors..'.. In reaching its decision, the court concluded that
the powers of the board of directors were "completely sterilized.""'9 This
decision highlights the relationship between sterilization, abdication, and
the nondelegation of certain functions of the board of directors.
Likewise, Delaware law declines to give "legal sanction to
agreements that have the effect of removing from directors in a very
substantial way their duty to use their own best judgment on
management matters .... Delaware courts hold that such delegation is an
and effectiveness, and the defensive tactic was reasonable in relation to the threat posed).
103. Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan. Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1281 (Del. 1988) (discussing the role
of directors to rely in good faith on the opinions of officers in the context of a sale of control); see also
Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 373 (Del. 2006) ("In the absence of red
flags, good faith in the context of oversight must be measured by the directors' actions 'to assure a
reasonable information and reporting system exists' and not by second-guessing after the occurrence
of employee conduct that results in an unintended adverse outcome." (citation omitted)); In re
Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 968 (Del. Ch. 1996) (framing the question of duty
of care in terms of the directors' "good faith effort to be informed and exercise judgment").
104. Mills Acquisition, 559 A.2d at 128o-81 (discussing the directors' breaches of fiduciary duties
in relation to a sale of control).
lO5. 77 N.E.2d 633, 634-35 (N.Y. 1948).
io6. Id. at 634.
107. Id. at 634-35.
lO8. Id. at 633-35: accord DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2001) ("[The] business and affairs of
every corporation... shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors.").
1O9. Long Park, 77 N.E.2d at 635; see also Triggs v. Triggs, 385 N.E.2d 1254, 1255 (N.Y. 1978)
(finding that provisions of a stock purchase agreement which contained provisions that purportedly
sterilized the board of directors were, in practice, ignored).
IO. WARD, JR. Er AL., supra note 99, § 14I.1.2 (relying on Chapin v. Benwood Found., Inc., 402
A.2d 1205, 1210 (Del. Ch. 1979)); see also In re Bally's Grand Derivative Litig., No. 14644, 1997 Del.
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"abdication" of directorial authority."' The concept of abdication is
similar to the concept of "sterilization," although the analysis shifts its
focus: in sterilization, the focus frequently is on the shareholders and
shareholder agreements," 2 while in abdication, the analysis generally
focuses on action or inaction by the board of directors itself."3 In this
respect, query whether the Disney board of directors abdicated its
essential statutory duties.
The fact-finder found that, as of December 12, 1996, the date on
which Eisner, Litvack, and Ovitz memorialized the termination, "the
Disney board had never met in order to vote on, or even discuss, the
termination at a full session, and few if any directors did an independent
investigation of whether Ovitz could be terminated for cause."".4
Likewise, much like the full board, "neither the [executive performance
plan committee] nor the compensation committee had a vote on the
matter, and it seems as though they had yet to have a substantive
discussion of whether Ovitz could be terminated for cause.." Such
inaction regarding the termination and whether such termination could
be made for cause suggests an abdication of directorial duty. Not only
was the board of directors not given the opportunity to vote on Ovitz's
termination, the matter was never substantively discussed at a duly
convened meeting. Nor is this a case where authority was delegated to an
appropriate committee of the board of directors," 6 as neither the
compensation nor any other committee focused on the matter of Ovitz's
termination. Rather, the decision to fire the president and putative "de
facto chief operating officer""' 7 of the company was made solely by
Eisner with input by a select few others. In this respect, it must be
remembered that the "mere fact that directors are gathered together
does not a meeting make." 8 Thus, Eisner's attempts to personally
Ch. LEXIS 77, at *12-13 (Del. Ch. June 4,1997); 1 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: LAW AND PRACTICE § 4.01
(Bart Schwartz & Amy L. Goodman eds., 2004).
ii i. See WARD, JR. ET AL., supra note 99, § 141.1.3; see also Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d 1207, 1214
(Del. 1996); DREXLER ET AL., supra note 89, § 13.01.
112. See Long Park, 77 N.E.2d at 634-35; see also Manson v. Curtis, 119 N.E. 559, 562 (N.Y. 1918).
113. See Grimes, 673 A.2d at 1214-15; see also Aaron D. Jones, Corporate Officer Wrongdoing and
the Fiduciary Duties of Corporate Officers Under Delaware Law, 44 AM. Bus. L.J. 475,5o6 (2007).
114. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 736 (Del. Ch. 2005), affd sub nom.
Brehm v. Eisner, 9o6 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006).
115. Id.
116. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(c) (2001 & Supp. 2006).
117. STEWART, supra note 17, at 212.
1s8. Fogel v. U.S. Energy Sys., Inc., No. 3271-CC, 2007 Del. Ch. LEXIS 178, at *7 (Del. Ch. Dec.
13, 2007) (citing Box v. Box, No. 14238, 1996 Del. Ch. LEXIS 16, at *14-I5 (Del. Ch. Feb. 15, 1996). In
Fogel, the court found that the corporation never actually held a meeting to terminate its CEO, and
thus any action taken during a purported meeting to terminate the CEO was void. See id. at *9-io.
The court in Fogel noted that "[s]imply 'polling board members does not constitute a valid meeting or
effective corporate action."' Id. at *7-8 (citation omitted). The facts of Disney bear close similarity to
the situation in Fogel. For example, Eisner testified that he had personally discussed terminating Ovitz
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contact and inform a majority of Disney's board do not imbue the
decision with board of director action. Ovitz's termination thus seems
largely devoid of any meaningful form of director oversight. The board
appears to have abdicated its obligation to oversee the management of
the corporation by failing to even discuss Ovitz's departure and the terms
of his not-for-cause termination.
D. CREATIVE ARTISTS AND AGENCY
This brings the analysis to perhaps its most important point: agency.
Indeed, having examined the language of Disney's governing documents
and the principles of Delaware corporation law, there remains the critical
task of discerning Eisner's authority as chief executive officer under the
scope of agency law. Remarkably, the Delaware Supreme Court never
addressed this issue. Under the law of agency, in construing the
enforceability of contracts entered into by the corporation at the
direction of a high-level corporate officer such as the CEO, numerous
courts have relied on principles of actual authority and inherent agency
power."9
The Restatement (Third) of Agency describes actual authority as
"when, at the time of taking action that has legal consequences for the
principal, the agent reasonably believes, in accordance with the
principal's manifestations to the agent, that the principal wishes the
agent so to act ..... The key examination for actual authority thus rests
with the principal's manifestations to the agent. Actual authority may be
either "express" or "implied." Generally, "express authority" refers to
actual authority that a principal has expressed in a detailed or specific
manner. 2' Implied authority generally includes the agent's authority "to
take action designated or implied in the principal's manifestations to the
agent and acts necessary or incidental to achieving the principal's
objectives, as the agent reasonably understands the principal's
with several board members, but failed to address the matter formally at a duly convened meeting of
the full board. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. Under the principles recently articulated in
Fogel, such informal discussions should not be considered valid action by the board of directors.
t19. See, e.g., Gumpert v. Bon Ami Co., 251 F.2d 735, 738-39 n.i (2d Cir. 1958) (questioning
whether hiring another corporate officer absent express board delegation is incident to corporate
officer's power); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Enjay Chem. Co. (now Exxon Corp.), 316 A.2d 219, 222
(Del. Super. Ct. 1974) (identifying three types of authority: express, implied, and apparent); Menard,
Inc. v. Dage-MTI, Inc., 726 N.E.2d 12o6, 1212 (Ind. 2000) (finding that a company was bound to a
contract by the inherent authority of its president); Newberry v. Barth, Inc., 252 N.w.2d 711, 714-15
(Iowa 1977) (finding that a corporate agent lacked express, implied, apparent, and inherent power to
bind the corporation to a real estate transaction).
120. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.01 (2006). See generally 3 AM. JUR. 2D Agency § 70
(2002).
121. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.01 cmt. b; 3 AM. JDR. 2D Agency § 70; see also Billops v.
Magness Constr. Co., 391 A.2d 196. 197-98 (Del. 1978).
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manifestations and objectives when the agent determines how to act .....
In both express and implied actual authority, the authority is derived
from the relationship between the principal and the agent, based on
either manifestations or statements from the principal to the agent.
Query whether Eisner acted with actual authority when terminating
Ovitz. In order to have actual authority, the "principal must make a
manifestation.. . that expresses this willingness" to allow another party
to act as its agent.'23 Such authority could come from the certificate of
incorporation or the bylaws; however, this Article has already addressed
the inconclusiveness of the certificate of incorporation and bylaws in
conferring concurrent removal power on both Eisner and the board of
directors. "4 Thus, Eisner may well have lacked the actual authority to
unilaterally fire the president of Disney. If Eisner lacked actual
authority, then analysis must focus on whether Eisner possessed any
other form of agency power.
In contrast to actual authority, apparent authority involves the
reasonable belief held by a third party. 5 Apparent authority has been
defined as "the power held by an agent or other actor to affect a
principal's legal relations with third parties when a third party reasonably
believes the actor has authority to act on behalf of the principal and that
belief is traceable to the principal's manifestations. ' '26 Thus, the power of
an agent under apparent authority may be determined based upon the
manifestations between the principal and the third party. This is because
the third party must have a reasonable belief that is "traceable to the
principal's manifestations.'.. Apparent authority, therefore, does not
require manifestations between the principal and the agent, just
"expressive conduct" between the principal and the third party."'
122. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.02. See generally Guyer v. Haveg Corp., 205 A.2d 176,
i8o (Del. Super. Ct. 1964).
123. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 3.01 cmt. b.
124. Assuming the certificate of incorporation properly authorized the CEO to terminate officers
unilaterally, the question then arises whether such delegation would be valid as a matter of law. Such
an inquiry becomes a matter of delegation and abdication, rather than a matter of agency. Under
Delaware law, the operative inquiry would be whether such delegation removes from the board its
duty of oversight, so as to violate section 141(a) of the Delaware General Corporation Law. See DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (20O). This question is distinct from whether a transaction is
"extraordinary" for the purposes of agency power. For further analysis of delegation and abdication,
see supra Part II.C and accompanying text. For a discussion of what is "ordinary" and "extraordinary,"
see infra Part II.E and accompanying text.
125. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 3.01 cmt. b.
126. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.03; see Billops, 391 A.2d at 198; 3 AM. JUR. 2D Agency
§ 76.
127. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.03.
128. Id. § 3.03 cmt. b; see also Finnegan Constr. Co. v. Robino-Ladd Co., 354 A.2d 142, 144-45
(Del. Super. Ct. 1976).
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Indeed, an agent acting solely with apparent authority lacks actual
authority.'29
Inherent authority is a concept that is somewhat related to apparent
authority. The Restatement (Third) of Agency, adopted in 2005, declines
to use the term "inherent authority" because it considers such authority
to be covered by other doctrines (such as respondeat superior).'3 ° Despite
the Restatement (Third)'s perspective, the doctrine of inherent authority
has been analyzed for decades, if not centuries, in U.S. case law.'3 '
Accordingly, this Article will examine inherent authority as articulated
by the Restatement (Second) and the courts. Under the Restatement
(Second) of Agency, inherent authority refers to the "power of an agent
which is derived not from authority, apparent authority or estoppel, but
solely from the agency relation and exists for the protection of persons
harmed by or dealing with a servant or other agent.' 32
Inherent authority and apparent authority are therefore related
concepts. Indeed, inherent authority and apparent authority seem so
similar that courts have had difficulty drawing a distinction between the
two concepts.'33 This difficulty in application of those two broad
principles of agency is one (of the many) reasons why the Restatement
(Third) elects to abolish the use of the term "inherent" authority.'34
Because of the difficulty in separating these two concepts, they will be
considered together (along with what is often called "implied"
authority'35).
Inherent authority has been found to provide broad powers to an
agent, based upon the customary authority of the agent. In Menard, Inc.
v. Dage-MTI, Inc., for example, the Indiana Supreme Court found that
inherent authority bound a corporation to a contract executed by its
president., 6 In Menard, the court held that an agent acts with inherent
authority when engaging in transactions that usually accompany or are
129. See 3 AM. JUR. 2D Agency § 75 (2002); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.03 cmt. b; see also
In re Mulco Prods., Inc., 123 A.2d 95, 103 (Del. Super. Ct. 1956).
130. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.01 cmt. b; Gregory S. Crespi, The Proposed
Abolition of Inherent Agency Authority by the Restatement (Third) of Agency: An Incomplete
Solution, 45 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 337, 354 (2005).
131. See, e.g., Gumpert v. Bon Ami Co., 251 F.2d 735, 738-39 (2d Cir. 1958); Roscoe Co. v. Lewis
Univ., Coll. of Law, 398 N.E.2d io83, io86 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979) (identifying inherent authority as one of
the three ways a principal may be bound by his agent); Fidelity & Cas. Co. of N.Y. v. Carroll, 117 N.E.
858, 859 (Ind. 1917) (discussing the agency inherent in certain corporate offices); Newberry v. Barth,
Inc., 252 N.W.2d 711,714 (Iowa 1977).
132. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 8A (1958); see also Menard, Inc. v. Dage-MTI, Inc., 726
N.E.2d 12o6, 1211 (Ind. 2000).
133. Crespi, supra note 13o, at 354.
134. See id.; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.01 cmt. b.
135. Some courts consider implied and inherent authority as similar concepts. See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.01.
136. 726 N.E.2d 1206, 1212 (Ind. 2000).
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incidental to transactions that that agent is authorized to conduct,
provided the third party reasonably believes that the agent is authorized,
and has no notice to the contrary. '37 In reaching this decision, the court
recognized that the president of a corporation is one of the officers
through which the corporation normally acts. As a result, the court found
that the president's actions were those that "usually accompany or are
incidental to transactions [that he was] authorized to conduct.'
' 8
Generally, the prevailing view is that the "president of a corporation
is empowered to transact, without special authorization from the board
of directors, all acts of an ordinary nature which are incident to the office
by usage or necessity and to thus bind the corporation."'39 Stated
conversely, acts that are extraordinary in nature are outside the bounds
of an executive's inherent authority. Of course, when courts and treatises
refer to the "president" of a corporation, they merely refer to the chief
executive, whether that officer is referred to as "president" or "CEO.""'4
References to the "president," for the purposes of this discussion,
therefore, will not be intended to refer to Ovitz, but rather Eisner, as the
CEO of Disney.
Under Delaware law, a CEO of a corporation may engage in
ordinary acts which are incident to his office,'4 ' and "by virtue of his
office he may enter into a contract and bind his corporation in matters
arising from and concerning the usual course of the corporation's
business."'42 These powers inhere to the chief executive as a result of her
position as such.'43 As has already been discussed, however, these powers
of the chief executive are not without limit under Delaware law.'"
Implicit in this analysis, therefore, is the concept that an agent's authority
137. Id.
138. Id. at 1214 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
139. 2A FLETCHER, supra note 91, § 559. Thus, "the president of a corporation has no apparent
authority to bind the corporation to an unusual, extraordinary, or unreasonable contract." Id. § 592.
140. See i9 C.J.S. Corporations § 553 (2007) ("The president is frequently the chief executive
officer of the company and invested with broad general powers of management, and accordingly has
many implied powers.").
141. Canister Co. v. Nat'l Can Corp., 63 F. Supp. 361, 367 (D. Del. 1945) ("The president, as a
general agent of a corporation, may perform all acts of an ordinary nature which by usage are incident
to the office.").
142. Joseph Greenspon's Sons Iron & Steel Co. v. Pecos Valley Gas Co., 156 A. 350, 352 (Del.
Super. Ct. 1931); see also Italo-Petroleum Corp. of Am. v. Hannigan, 14 A.2d 401,406 (Del. 1940).
143. See Canister Co., 63 F. Supp. at 367.
I44. See, e.g., Andrew Jergens Co. v. Woodbury, Inc., 273 F. 952, 962 (D. Del. i92i) (stating that
execution of a contract that completely divests a corporation of all its assets "is, in the absence of
corporate authorization or ratification, beyond the power of the president of a corporation to make");
Bruch v. Nat'l Guar. Credit Corp., 1 16 A. 738, 740 (Del. Ch. 1922) (finding that a corporate president
has "no implied or inherent power to consent to the appointment of a receiver" to wind-up the
corporation's affairs); At. Ref. Co. v. Ingalls & Co., 185 A. 885, 886 (Del. Super. Ct. 1936) (explaining
that the president of a corporation "has no implied or presumed authority" to bind the corporation by
a contract of guaranty, in which the corporation does not have an interest).
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may not exceed the "legitimate scope" of what is necessary to perform
the agent's delegated duties.'45
E. THE "INCREDIBLES" OF THE TRANSACTION: WHAT Is EXTRAORDINARY?
Transactions authorized under the inherent or implied authority of a
chief executive officer must, therefore, be ordinary.' The next step in
the analysis of Eisner's authority to unilaterally terminate Ovitz from
Disney's presidency thus rests with the nature of the transaction: was this
an unusual or extraordinary transaction? Such questions regarding the
ordinary or extraordinary nature of a transaction are usually questions of
fact. 7
In one of his several opinions in the Disney case, Chancellor
Chandler described the "corporate board's extraordinary decision to
award a $140 million severance package" to Ovitz. 14 It is interesting that
the chancellor refers to the Disney board's decision as "extraordinary,"
when the decision to award this severance package was, in fact, made by
CEO Eisner.'49 Also, in this casual reference to the payment, the
chancellor chooses to use the word "extraordinary" to describe the
termination.5 ' Of course, such casual language does not characterize the
transaction as "extraordinary" as a matter of law. Nonetheless, the
chancellor's use of this term is indicative that Ovitz's termination,
thereby triggering the $130 million severance package, was no ordinary
matter.
With respect to the economics of the transaction, for the fiscal year
ending September 29, 2007, Disney reported $35.51 billion in revenues
and $4.687 billion in net income.'' These financial figures reflect the fact
that Disney is a huge corporation. In 2007, Disney ranked sixty-fourth on
the Fortune 500 list.'52 When faced with these financial numbers, a
severance payment of over $130 million may appear rather insignificant.
Indeed, in the chancery court opinion, Chancellor Chandler addresses
the fact that, relative to the size of the corporation, the terms of Ovitz's
145. Kolcum v. Bd. of Educ., 335 A.2d 618, 623 (Del. Super. Ct. 1975); see also Amtower v.
Hercules Inc., No. 97C-09-oI8, 1999 Del. Super. LEXIS Io7, at *31 (Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 26, 1999).
146. See WARD, JR. ET AL., supra note 99, § 142.6 (arguing that, even "if an officer is also a general
manager" with powers that "are markedly broader than the inherent powers of a president or other
officer," those powers still have limits); Colish v. Brandywine Raceway Ass'n, I 19 A.2d 887, 891 (Del.
Super. Ct. 1955) (holding that, although general managers are considered to possess broad powers,
they still have "no implied authority to enter into [an] unusual and extraordinary contract").
147. Lee v. Jenkins Bros., 268 F.2d 357, 370 (2d Cir. 1959); see also Mgmt. Techs. v. Morris, 961 F.
Supp. 640,648 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); DREXLER ET AL., supra note 89, § 14.02 (2O07).
148. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d 342, 350 (Del. Ch. 1998), affd in part, rev'd
in part sub nor. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000) (emphasis added).
149. Id.
I5O. Id.
i51. Walt Disney Co., Annual Report (Form lo-K), at 28-29 (Nov. 21, 2007).
152. Largest U.S. Corporations, FORTUNE, Apr. 30, 2007, at F-3.
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employment and termination seem small. '53 However, as is well
recognized, quantitative magnitude is not the only factor to consider
when analyzing the importance of a transaction; one must also consider
the qualitative impact of the transaction to assess its overall magnitude.
54
Significantly, although Chancellor Chandler recognizes the overall size of
the corporation relative to the payment, he still describes the severance
package as "extraordinary."'55
The qualitative features of a transaction cannot be ignored during
analysis. For example, in the context of assessing qualitative materiality
of a misrepresentation in a financial statement, the staff of the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) has promulgated Staff Accounting
Bulletin 99 (SAB 99).,56 Under SAB 99, the SEC staff advised that both
the "quantitative" and the "qualitative" aspects of an item must be
evaluated.'57 Also, as observed by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in
ascertaining whether a transaction is extraordinary, "a payment made by
a company that would otherwise be unremarkable may be rendered
extraordinary by unusual circumstances."" Admittedly, materiality, at
times, is distinct from extraordinariness, but overlap between the two
concepts provides a useful tool for analysis. Furthermore, when
determining whether authority was delegated to a chief executive officer,
the "likelihood that a board intends to delegate authority for a particular
matter usually will be related inversely to the significance of the action
for the corporation."'59 Also of relevance is the Ninth Circuit's inclusion
of the circumstances surrounding the transaction, and the purpose of the
transaction (in addition to the size of the transaction), in its list of
153. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 768 n.533 (Del. Ch. 2005), affd sub
nom. Brehm v. Eisner, 9o6 A.2d 27 (Del. 2o06).
154. SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99, 64 Fed. Reg. 45,150, 45,151 (i999); see, e.g., Ganino v.
Citizens Utils. Co., 228 F.3d 154, 63 (2d Cir. 2ooo) (evaluating the materiality of a transaction
according to both quantitative and qualitative factors).
155. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d 432,350 (Del. Ch. 1998).
156. SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99, 64 Fed. Reg. 45,150 (999) (stating that a fact is
deemed material if a reasonable investor would consider such information important in making an
investment or voting decision); see also Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231-32 (1988); Dearlove,
SEC Initial Decision Release No. 315, 2006 SEC LEXIS 1684, at *143 (July 27, 2006) (recognizing that
SAB 99 expresses the SEC's view that financial misstatements are not immaterial merely because they
fall below a numerical threshold).
157. SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin 99, 64 Fed. Reg. at 45,15 1; see Ganino, 228 F.3d at 163 (finding
SAB 99 "persuasive guidance" for evaluating materiality focusing on both quantitative and qualitative
factors); see also In re Huntington Bancshares, Inc., Securities Act Release No. 8579, Exchange Act
Release No. 51,781, 85 SEC Docket 1433 (June 2, 2005) (noting that materiality analysis for financial
misstatements under SAB 99 requires an analysis of both quantitative and qualitative factors).
158. SEC v. Gemstar-TV Guide Int'l, Inc., 401 F.3d 1031, 1045 (9 th Cir. 2005), cert. denied sub
nor. Yuen v. SEC, 546 U.S. 933 (2005); see also Ganino, 228 F.3d at 163-64.
159. Mgmt. Techs., Inc. v. Morris, 961 F. Supp. 640, 648 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (discussing whether a
CEO, whose position was never created in the company bylaws, had the authority to act in insolvency
proceedings in the United Kingdom).
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"context-specific" factors for determining extraordinariness under the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act.'6 Such an analysis clearly embraces the qualitative
aspects, and not solely the quantitative size, of the transaction.
At first glance, Ovitz's no-fault termination payment appears to be a
nonevent, constituting less than i% of Disney's assets and income. 6'
Chancellor Chandler reflected on this small percentage. ' Under a
qualitative measure, however, a different rationale comes into play.
Exorbitant termination severance payments to the president of a Fortune
ioo company may potentially cause havoc to a company's market
following, particularly institutional shareholders who are concerned with
vibrant corporate governance standards.' 6' To thus point solely to
quantitative dollar amounts ignores the economic reality underlying such
conduct. Under standards of modern corporate governance, the
termination and severance payments to Ovitz were of a material nature,
deserving of board of director consideration.
To illustrate further, under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the term
"extraordinary" payment has been defined as a payment "that would not
typically be made by a company in its customary course of business."'
6
,
The Ninth Circuit, in conducting its analysis of what constituted such an
"extraordinary" payment, considered "[c]ontext-specific factors such as
the circumstances under which the payment is contemplated or made, the
purpose of the payment, and the size of the payment. '' 6' These factors
thus constitute part of a fact-specific inquiry into the context and
circumstances surrounding the payment. The Ninth Circuit has thus held
that payment of $29.48 million and 5.27 million shares of restricted stock
to a corporate CEO constituted an "extraordinary" payment under
section 1103 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. '66
16o. Gemstar-TV Guide, 401 F.3d at 1045. See generally JOHN T. BOSTELMAN, THE SARBANES-OXLEY
DESKBOOK (2oo8); MARC I. STEINBERG, ATrORNEY LIABILITY AFTER SARBANES-OXLEY (2008); Joseph F.
Morrissey, Catching the Culprits: Is Sarbanes-Oxley Enough?, 2003 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 8oi (2003).
161. See Walt Disney Co., Annual Report (Form io-K), at 28-29 (Nov. 21, 2007) (reporting assets
of almost $6i billion in 2007 and net income of $4.687 billion).
162. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 768 n.533 (Del. Ch. 2005), affd sub
nom. Brehm v. Eisner, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006).
163. See A Vote Against Disney, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 1997, at B7; Paul Farhi, Disney's Dizzying
Bonus Approved for CEO Eisner: Dissenters Protest 'Lucrative' Package at Shareholders Meeting,
WASH. POST, Feb. 26, 1997, at CIi; Bruce Orwall & Joann S. Lublin, The Rich Rewards of a Hollywood
Exit, WALL ST. J., Dec. I6, 1996, at BI.
164. Gemstar-TV Guide, 401 F.3d at 1045 (holding that payments to company insiders during an
SEC investigation for securities fraud were "extraordinary" under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act).
t65. Id. The transactions to which the court applied its test for "extraordinariness" consisted of a
payment of $29.48 million and 5.27 million shares of restricted stock to the CEO, and a payment of
$8.i6 million, i.i million shares of common stock, and 353,680 of restricted stock to the CFO. Id. at
1037. These payments, occurring amidst accusations of accounting inconsistency, were part of a
"resignation" agreement with the corporate board in which the CEO and CFO agreed to resign from
their offices, but remain employees. Id.
i66. Id. at 1045-46.
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In Disney, Eisner, rather than the board of directors, fired the
company's president, thereby triggering a not-for-cause termination
package totaling over $130 million; this $130 million payment
compensated Ovitz for fourteen months of work in the Disney
presidency. 167 In the words of Holman Jenkins of the Wall Street Journal,
"nobody in the real world, not even in the far-out precincts of
Hollywood, gets that kind of money for flubbing up after a year on the
job." '68 In fact, Ovitz's not-for-cause termination amounted to "the
equivalent of more than 5000 weeks of salary after just over a year on the
job."' ' In the decision below, Chancellor Chandler opined that:
[A] reasonably prudent CEO... would not have acted in as unilateral
a manner as did Eisner when essentially committing the corporation to
hire a second-in-command, appoint that person to the board, and
provide him with one of the largest and richest employment contracts
ever enjoyed by a non-CEO.7
Indeed, one reporter posed the question: "if somehow Mr. Ovitz had
earned that kind of payoff so quickly, why would Mr. Eisner push out
such a valuable property, and so expensively?""' Thus, while the amount
of compensation paid to Ovitz in relation to the overall size of Disney
may not be that immense, the gargantuan qualitative scope of the
termination and subsequent severance payment have been well explored.
F. RATIFICATION BY THE HOUSE OF MOUSE
Finally, the doctrines of ratification and estoppel provide
alternatives to actual and apparent authority under agency law.
Ratification refers to the "affirmance of a prior act done by another,
whereby the act is given effect as if done by an agent acting with actual
authority.'. 2 Ratification thus serves to confirm the legitimacy of a prior
act on behalf of the principal.'73 In a related manner, estoppel refers to
situations in which an actor's manifestations "induce[d] the third party to
make a detrimental change in position."'74 When these manifestations
have induced such detrimental reliance, the actor making the
67. Brehm v. Eisner (In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig.), 906 A.2d 27,35 (Del. 2006).
I68. Holman W. Jenkins, Jr., Beavis and Butt-head Do the Disney Shareholders, WALL ST. J., Jan.
7, 1997, at A17.
169. Eric Dash, Hire by the Contract Now, Risk a Big Regret Later, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2007, at
Ci, C6.
170. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 761-62 (Del. Ch. 2005), affd sub nor.
Brehm v. Eisner, 9o6 A.2d 27,35 (Del. 2006).
171. A.M. Rosenthal, Op-Ed., Hardtack for the Journey, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 1996, at A25.
172. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 4.01(l) (20o6); see also Hannigan v. Italo Petroleum
Corp., 47 A.2d 169, 173 (Del. 1945); Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327, 334-35 (Del. Ch. 1997).
173. Hannigan, 47 A.2d at 173.




manifestations may be "estopped" from denying the transaction's
validity.'7
The timing of the ratification is an important element of confirming
authority.' 76 A critical distinction must be drawn, however, between
ratification in the past for previous actions, and ratification for a present
action. Several Disney officers in the past had been fired without any
action from the board of directors.'" "Implied authority of the president
of a corporation cannot be inferred from the fact that in other instances
the president's previously unauthorized acts have been ratified by the
board of directors.',,,8 In other words, the concepts of ratification and
implied authority must not be conflated when determining a chief
executive's authority to bind the corporation. Thus, when considering
whether Eisner possessed the authority to terminate Ovitz independent
of the board of directors, manifestations that may be deemed
"ratifications" for past unauthorized terminations of other Disney
officers cannot be considered a source for Eisner's present inherent or
implied authority to unilaterally fire Ovitz.
Furthermore, by implication, other officers may well have been
lower-level officers, but Ovitz was president. Thus, even if previous acts
in fact were authorized or ratified, Ovitz's termination and severance are
of an entirely different category. The firing of the number-two executive
in the corporate hierarchy should be treated differently than the
dismissal of lower level officers such as corporate vice presidents.
Nonetheless, even if Eisner originally lacked the authority to
unilaterally terminate Ovitz from Disney's presidency, thereby triggering
the severance payment, the board of directors ratified the transaction.
Ratification of a transaction may occur by virtue of the principal's
"fail[ure] to object to it or to repudiate it."' 79 Because the Disney board
of directors declined to object to Ovitz's termination, the board, in all
practicality, ratified the transaction. Indeed, "[m]any directors believed
that Eisner had the power to fire Ovitz on his own and that he did not
need to convene a board meeting to do so."' S
For the purposes of this Article, however, ratification and estoppel
are immaterial: the principal impact of the Disney case lies not in the
175. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 4.08; 3 AM. JUR. 2D Agency § 79 (2002); see also Guyer v.
Haveg Corp., 205 A.2d 176, 181 (Del. Super. Ct. 1964).
176. RESTATEMENT (TmRD) OF AGENCY § 4.05; see also 3 AM. JUR. 2D Agency § 177 (2008).
177. See Brehm v. Eisner (In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig.), 906 A.2d 27, 69-70 (Del. 2006).
178. I8B AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 1337 (2004) (emphasis added) (citing Stoneman v. Fox Film
Corp., 4 N.E.2d 63 (Mass. 1936)).
179. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 4.01 cmt. f (2006); 3 AM. JUR. 2D Agency § 193 (20o8);
Law v. Cross, 66 U.S. 533,539 (1861).
18o. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 736 (Del. Ch. 2005), affd sub nom.
Brehm v. Eisner, 9o6 A.2d 27,35 (Del. 2006).
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legitimacy of Ovitz's not-for-cause termination payment, but rather in
the scope of CEO authority. Indeed, the Delaware Supreme Court had
the opportunity to decide the case in favor of the defendants based on
the doctrine of ratification, which would have avoided the consequence
of unduly expanding the powers of the chief executive to act
independently of the board. The fact that the board likely ratified the
decision to terminate Ovitz without cause pales in importance when
compared to the fact that the Delaware Supreme Court has expanded the
authority of a chief executive at the expense of corporate boards of
directors.
III. A WHOLE NEW WORLD? IMPACT OF DISNEY ON GOOD GOVERNANCE
AND DIRECTOR INDEPENDENCE
In the current climate of corporate governance, great emphasis is
placed on the concept of "independent" directors serving on corporate
boards. 8In this regard, the major securities markets have rules requiring
that all listed companies have a majority of independent directors."' For
example, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) requires that listed
companies have "a majority of independent directors" as part of its
corporate governance requirements.' In the NYSE's commentary, it
explains that requiring independent directors "will increase the quality of
board oversight and lessen the possibility of damaging conflicts of
interest."'" NYSE rules also require that the nominating/corporate
governance committee, compensation committee, and the audit
committee be comprised entirely of independent directors.'5 Similarly,
the NASDAQ Stock Market (NASDAQ) contains a requirement that a
majority of the board of directors of listed companies be comprised of
independent directors. ' In addition, the NASDAQ rules require that
the compensation committee and the audit committee be comprised
solely of independent directors.'
Both the NYSE and NASDAQ have specific requirements for what
qualifies as "independence" for the purposes of director qualification.
For example, NYSE rules require that the company's board of directors
affirmatively establish that the director in question has no "material
relationship" with the company in order to meet the standard for
I8I. ABA COMM. ON CORPORATE LAWS, CORPORATE DIRECTOR's GUIDEBOOK 38 (5th ed. 2007)
[hereinafter ABA GUIDEBOOK].
182. Id.; see infra notes 183-87 and accompanying text.
183. NYSE, Inc., Listed Company Manual § 3o3A.oi (2003).
184. Id. § 3o3A.oi cmt.
185. Id. §§ 3o3A.04(a), 3o3A.05, 3 o3 A.o7(b).
186. NASDAQ, Inc., Manual Rule 4350(c) (2o06).
187. Id. R. 4350(c)(3), 4 35o(d)(2)(A)(i). With respect to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act's requirements in
this regard, see infra notes 194-96 and accompanying text.
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independence.'8 In addition, the NSYE rules identify certain
relationships that defeat independence.'8 Such relationships include:
being an employee of the company within the previous three years or
having an immediate family member that was an executive officer within
those three years, receiving $120,000 in direct compensation (other than
directors' fees and pensions) from the company during any twelve-month
period within the previous three years, working for the company's
auditor under certain circumstances, serving as an executive officer of
another company with respect to which any of the company's present
executive officers serve on such other company's compensation
committee, and being a current employee of a company that made
payments to or received payments from the present company within the
past three years if those payments exceed the greater of $I million or 2%
of the company's consolidated gross revenues." Each of these
disqualifications also implicates directors whose immediate family
members meet such criteria.'9 ' NASDAQ rules contain similar
requirements and tests for director independence.'92  Both stock
exchanges also have rules requiring executive sessions to be attended by
independent directors. 93
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act also contains requirements of
independence.'94 Under Sarbanes-Oxley, the audit committee of a
publicly held company must be comprised solely of independent
directors.'95 Sarbanes-Oxley has its own definition of "independence,"
separate from the definitions used by the stock exchanges. Under
Sarbanes-Oxley, a director is not considered independent for
qualification as an audit committee member if such director accepts any
188. NYSE, Inc., Listed Company Manual § 303A.02(a).
189. Id. § 3 03A.02(b).
19o. Id.
191. Id.
192. A director will not be considered "independent" if, during the preceding three years: he was
employed by the company; with certain exceptions, he or a family member received over $12o,ooo
from the company over any twelve-month period; his family member was an executive of the
company; he or a family member was a partner, controlling shareholder, or executive of a company
that paid or received the greater of $2oo,oo0 or 5% of the recipient's gross revenues; he or a family
member served as an executive of another company for which an executive of the present company
served on the compensation committee; he or a family member participated in the outside audit of the
company; or he is an "interested person" according to the Investment Company Act of 1940.
NASDAQ, Inc., Manual Rule 4200(a)(I5).
193. NASDAQ, Inc., Manual Rule 4350(c)(2) (defining an executive session as a meeting of board
directors at which only "independent" directors are present); NYSE, Inc., Listed Company Manual
§ 303A.o3 (defining an executive session as a meeting of board directors at which only "non-
management" directors are present); NYSE, Inc., Listed Company Manual § 303A.03 cmt. (explaining
that such executive sessions are designed to "promote open discussion" among independent directors).
194. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § IoA(m)(3)(A), Pub. L. No. 291, 48 Stat. 88t (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-I(m)(3)(A) (2006)).
195. Id.; see also 148 CONG. REc. S6327, 6332 (daily ed. July 8, 2002) (statement of Sen. Sarbanes).
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compensatory fee (other than director fees) from the company, or is an
affiliated person of the company or any of its subsidiaries.' 96 "Affiliated
persons" are defined generally to include those persons owning or
controlling at least 5% of the outstanding stock of the company.'"
Furthermore, publicly held companies must identify in their annual
proxy statements to their shareholders the names of the respective
company's independent directors.' gs In addition, the company must
disclose specified information that it considered when making its
independence determination.'99 Based upon these developments in the
law, the Corporate Director's Guidebook2" states that in order to
function most effectively, the board of directors of a public corporation
"must exercise independent judgment in carrying out its
responsibilities."' 0' Thus, director independence today "is a prevailing
theme in corporate governance, if not always in corporate law."'.
Indeed, in reviewing his twelve-year term on the Delaware Supreme
Court, former Chief Justice E. Norman Veasey recognized the "courts'
deepened reliance on independent directors and an expectation that
directors will act thoughtfully and in good faith."20 3 Other observers also
have reflected that the "move to independent directors, which began as a
'good governance' exhortation, has become in some respects a
mandatory element of corporate law."2 4 Sarbanes-Oxley, stock exchange
196. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § ioA(m)(3)(B); cf. NASDAQ, Inc., Manual Rule
42oo(a)(I5) (2003); NYSE, Inc., Listed Company Manual § 3 o3 A.02(b) (2003).
197. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(a)(I9) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 8oa-2(a)(3)).
198. See SEC Schedule 14A, Item 7, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14A-ioi (2008).
199. Id.; see ABA GUIDEBOOK, supra note 181, at 39 ("Public corporations must disclose in their
annual meeting proxy statements the names of the independent directors, as well as the principles
underlying the independence determination and any transactions, relationships, or arrangements not
otherwise disclosed that were considered by the board in determining whether the director is
independent.").
200. The Corporate Director's Guidebook is a guidebook published by the ABA Committee on
Corporate Laws of the ABA Section of Business Law. Id. at vii. The Committee on Corporate Laws
recently released its fifth edition, which espouses the theme of the "increasingly vital role that
directors play in protecting investors' interests and in directing and overseeing corporate strategy and
its execution by senior officers." Id. The Committee was chaired by former Chief Justice of the
Delaware Supreme Court, E. Norman Veasey. Id. at viii.
201. Id. at 38.
202. E. Norman Veasey & Christine T. Di Guglielmo, What Happened in Delaware Corporate Law
and Governance from 1992-2004? A Retrospective on Some Key Developments, 153 U. PA. L. REv.
1399, 1472 (2005).
203. Id. at 14o6.
204. Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 1950-2005: Of
Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465, 1468 (2007). In 1978, then SEC
Chairman Harold M. Williams emphasized the importance of independent directors in the corporate
governance framework. Harold M. Williams, Chairman, Securities Exch. Comn'n, Address at the
Fifth Annual Securities Regulation Institute: Corporate Accountability (Jan. i8, 1978). See generally
Ralph C. Ferrara & Marc I. Steinberg, A Reappraisal of Santa Fe: Rule iob-5 and the New Federalism,
129 U. PA. L. REV. 263 (i980).
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rules, and court decisions have thus brought about many reforms; the
impact of these reforms is to elevate the importance of the independent
director in the corporate governance framework."5
More specifically within Delaware case law, Delaware courts
recognize, and indeed emphasize, the importance of independent
directors. Vice Chancellor Strine has acknowledged "the strong role
that our law gives to independent directors."2' 6 For example, in related
party transactions, the role of disinterested directors in the quest to
achieve fairness has been stressed. 7 In the shareholder derivative suit
context, in ascertaining demand futility, Delaware courts examine the
disinterestedness and independence of the subject directors.2 In this
setting, the Delaware courts place great emphasis specifically on the
independence of special litigation committees in seeking the termination
of shareholder derivative actions.2" Furthermore, in sale of control
transactions, the Delaware Supreme Court has focused on the
particularly critical role that independent directors play, emphasizing the
importance of independent directors in determining the good faith use of
defensive measures in corporate takeovers." '
With this current climate of corporate governance in mind, the wider
implications of the Disney case become more apparent. This holding
205. Gordon, supra note'2o4, at 1539; see also Paramount Commc'ns v. QVC Network, 637 A.2d
34, 44 (Del. 1994) (discussing the importance of independent directors in sale of control transactions);
Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1281, 1285 (Del. 1989) (discussing the role of
independent directors in scrutinizing transactions); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d
946, 955 (Del. 1985) (discussing the role of independent directors in the use of defensive tactics in
corporate takeovers); Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 788-89 (Del. x98I) (establishing
independence as the first part of a two-part test for determining the legitimacy of a special litigation
committee).
206. In re Cox Commc'ns, Inc. S'holders Litig., 879 A.2d 604, 647 (Del. Ch. 2005).
207. See, e.g., Krasner v. Moffett, 826 A.2d 277, 286 (Del. 2003) (holding that, where the majority
of the board had potential self-interest in a merger, the independence of a special committee of
disinterested directors used to approve the merger is a fact-intensive inquiry); Marciano v. Nakash,
535 A.2d 400, 404 (Del. 1987) (referring to the importance of majority approval of disinterested
directors for interested director transactions); Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.zd 701, 710-I (Del.
1983) (discussing the general test of fairness that should be applied to related-party transactions, and
specifically cash-out mergers).
208. See, e.g., Fagin v. Gilmartin, 432 F.3 d 276, 283 (3 d Cir. 2005) (applying Delaware law in
finding that demand was not excused because the mere fact that a director is also an officer does not
defeat that director's independence); Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 366-67 (Del. 2006) (discussing the
standards for finding demand futility if the directors are not disinterested and independent); Braddock
v. Zimmerman, o6 A.2d 776. 786 (Del. 2oo6) (discussing the role of a "new" board of independent
directors determining demand-excuse); Beam v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1049 (Del. 2004) (discussing
the standards for establishing interest or lack of independence in demand futility cases); Desimone v.
Barrows, 924 A.2d 908, 943 (Del. Ch. 2007) (finding that plaintiff had not pleaded facts with sufficient
particularity to establish demand excusal).
209. See, e.g., Zapata, 430 A.2d at 788-89 (establishing independence as the first part of a two-part
test for determining the legitimacy of a special litigation committee).




goes well beyond a mere reaffirmance of the business judgment rule.
Rather, the Disney case raises serious questions about the efficacy of
recent corporate governance reforms. The emphasis on director
"independence" has been recognized by legislators, courts, regulators,
the private sector, scholars, and observers alike. Reforms have
accentuated the need for "independent" directors to serve on boards in
order to improve corporate governance in the United States.
Nonetheless, if such reforms are as important as they seem, then how can
they be reconciled with the Disney case? If a CEO such as Michael
Eisner can legitimately wield such unilateral power as was demonstrated
in this case, the inquiry is raised whether the Delaware courts are willing
to enunciate meaningful corporate governance standards in controversial
cases.
Furthermore, assuming that concurrent removal power was
conferred upon Eisner in the certificate of incorporation and bylaws,
another important (and as of yet unanswered) question arises: whether
delegation of an extraordinary matter is an unlawful delegation
constituting directorial abdication."' Indeed, what consequence would
follow if such extraordinary delegation is not unlawful abdication? By
implication, it would seem that many of the current corporate
governance reforms involving independent director oversight could
possibly be evaded through express delegation in corporate certificates
of incorporation, bylaws, and board resolutions.
CONCLUSION
The Disney case recognized Eisner's unilateral actual authority to
terminate without cause the company's president, causing the issuance of
a $130 million severance payment. This event took place with no board
of director discussion or approval. Thus, we come to the critical question,
the answer to which is not yet resolved: to what degree will this decision
adversely impact the role of independent directors in effectuating
meaningful corporate governance? In this regard, the Delaware Supreme
Court overlooked the consequences of its decision in Disney. The
decision fails to reconcile Eisner's expansive authority with the emerging
importance of director independence in corporate governance.
Chancellor Chandler recognized Eisner's "imperial" control at
Disney: "[b]y virtue of his Machiavellian (and imperial) nature as CEO,
and his control over Ovitz's hiring in particular, Eisner to a large extent
is responsible for the failings in process that infected and handicapped
the board's decisionmaking abilities ..... This is ironic in the face of the
211. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
212. In re Wait Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 9o7 A.2d 693, 76o (Del. Ch. 2005). affd sub nom.
Brehm v. Eisner, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2o06).
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Delaware courts' own opinions emphasizing the importance of
independent directors. If a corporate CEO has the authority the
Delaware Supreme Court casually embraces in the Disney case, then how
is the public to interpret that court's own opinions extolling the presence
of independent directors as a safeguard in corporate governance? The
answer may well be that the court is perceived as engaging in mere
"jawboning," declining to enforce these exhortations in the "real" world
where serious money damages and other significant sanctions are at
issue..2"3
In the wake of the various corporate scandals during the last decade,
corporate governance standards thus have come under greater scrutiny.
An important aspect of this scrutiny has been the emphasis on the service
of independent directors in the corporate boardroom. The Delaware
Supreme Court's decision in the Disney case, however, is difficult to
reconcile with the perceived importance of independent directors.
Indeed, if principles of agency and delegation truly confer such unilateral
power upon the chief executive, as the court seems to suggest, then the
effect of independent directors on meaningful corporate governance is
diminished.
213. Cf Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 893 (Del. 1985) (holding directors of the subject
company personally liable for their violation of the duty of care during a corporate merger). The
legislative response to the holding in Van Gorkom was the enactment of raincoat provisions protecting
directors from personal liability in duty of care situations. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § Io2(b)(7)
(2oo). As has already been discussed, the court could have avoided the specter of director liability by
applying the doctrine of ratification. See supra notes 172-77 and accompanying text.
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